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Among the most visible symptoms of the ‘euro’ crisis are the high and variable risk 
premia  that  peripheral  countries  have  to  pay  on  their  public  debt.  Moreover,  an 
influential paper by Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff suggested that a public 
debt level above 90% of GDP leads to a very high cost in terms of lower growth. The 
policy prescription for solving the crisis thus seemed simple: austerity. Fiscal deficits 
must be cut to reduce debt levels. 
However, this debate about austerity and the cost of high public debt misses a key 
point:  Public  debt  owed  to  foreigners  is  different  from  debt  owed  to  residents. 
Foreigners cannot vote for the higher taxes or lower expenditure needed to service 
the  debt.  Moreover,  a  higher  interest  rate  or  risk  premium  just  leads  to  more 
redistribution within the country (from taxpayers to bond holders) in the case of 
domestic debt. But in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to 
a welfare loss for the country as a whole because the government has to transfer 
resources  abroad.  A  larger  transfer  to  foreigners  in  turn  usually  requires  a 
combination  of  a  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  and  a  reduction  in  domestic 
expenditure.  
This distinction between foreign and domestic debt is particularly important in the 
context  of the euro crisis, because euro area countries  cannot devalue to increase 
exports if this is required to service foreign debt.  
The evidence confirms that the ‘euro’ crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but 
about foreign debt. Only those countries that were running large current account 
deficits were affected by the crisis. The figure below shows the strong relationship 
between the risk spread and the foreign debt of euro area countries that had large 
current account deficits. The case of Belgium is particularly interesting because the 
risk premium on Belgian government debt has remained modest throughout most of 
the euro crisis period, although the debt ratio of the country is above the euro area 
average (around 100% of GDP) – and it managed to function without a government 
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An even starker example of the crucial difference between foreign and domestic debt 
is provided by Japan, which has by far the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among OECD 
countries,  but  (at  least  so  far)  the  country  has  not  experienced  a  debt  crisis  and 
interest rates remain, at around 1%, exceptionally low. The reason is clearly that the 
country has run sizeable current account surpluses for decades; and has thus more 
than sufficient domestic savings to absorb all this debt at home. 
What does this imply for the austerity debate in Europe? If foreign debt matters more 
than public debt, the key adjustment variable is the external, current account deficit, 
not the fiscal deficit. A country that has a balanced current account does not need any 
additional foreign capital.  
The reason that risk premia are continuing to fall in the euro area despite very high 
political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large deficits elsewhere is the same: the 
current account deficits of the countries in the periphery are falling rapidly, thus 
diminishing the need for foreign capital.  
The debate about austerity and the high cost of public debt is thus misleading on two 
accounts.  
First, it has often been pointed out that austerity can be self-defeating in the sense 
that a reduction in the fiscal deficit can actually lead in the short run to an increase in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio if both the debt level and the multiplier are large. However, 
austerity can never be self-defeating for the external, the current account, adjustment. 
On  the  contrary,  the  larger  the  fall  in  domestic  demand  in  response  to  a  cut  in 
government  expenditure,  the  more  imports  will  fall  and  the  stronger  will  be  the 
improvement in the current account (and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk 
premium).  
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The experience of Italy is again instructive: the large tax increases implemented by 
the Monti government in 2012 had a stronger than expected impact on demand. GDP 
is falling so much that the debt-to-GDP ratio is actually increasing, and the actual 
deficit is improving only marginally because government revenues are falling along 
with GDP. But a side effect of the fall in GDP is a strong fall in imports and thus a 
strong  improvement  in  the  current  account  –  which  is  the  reason  why  the  risk 
premium  continues  to  fall  despite  the  political  turmoil  created  by  the  recent 
inconclusive election. 
Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the debate about the Reinhard and Rogoff 
results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency (like 
the UK) or even more the US, which have the privilege of indebting themselves to 
foreigners in their own currency, do not face a direct financing constraint. For these 
countries it matters whether history suggests that there is a strong threshold effect 
once public debt exceeds 90% of GDP. But the peripheral countries in the euro area 
simply did not have a choice: They had to reduce their deficits because the foreign 
capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.  
But the reverse is also true: as soon as the current account turns into a surplus, the 
pressure from financial markets abates. This is likely to happen soon. At this point 
peripheral countries will regain their fiscal sovereignty – and will be able to ignore 
Reinhard and Rogoff’s warning at their own risk. 
 
 